Outline:
1st Problem
introduction
2nd Gold
backing - a requirement for monetary stability?
3rd
Advantage of one always disadvantage of the other (mercantilism)
4th Only
work creates value?
5th
Saturation thesis
6th Do deterministic
processes exist?
7th Is
growth necessary for full employment?
8th
Purchasing power theory
9th Quotaism - suitable for avoiding discrimination?
10th Will
of the people only fulfilled with proportional representation?
11th Budget
deficit automatically a burden on the future generation?
12th Taxes
on profits cannot be passed on?
Outline:
1st
Introduction
2nd
Teaching history as a history of errors
3rd
Statements about reality versus approaches
4th
Theories versus thought models
5th
Different statement types
6th
Problems with metaphysical statements
7th
Singular statements
8th General
statements
9th The
demand for general validity
10th Human
freedom and general validity
1st
Introduction
The following lecture will deal with famous mistakes
made by scientists. 'To err is human', as is commonly said, and this certainly
applies to scientists as well. Generally, we must assume that human beings as
well as human actions in particular are imperfect, this is true in every
respect, both with regard to human abilities as well as their moral behaviour,
furthermore for all important societal systems, for technology, economy,
politics, even for cultural systems, which also include the sciences.
In this lecture, I would like to limit myself to the
field of science. Here, we also must assume that in the course of history,
theories have been developed again and again, which have proved to be errors in
retrospect. However, when we take a closer look at the significance of these
errors, we realise that this imperfection of scientists refers first and
foremost to the individual scientists themselves and less to the entire
scientific system. The statement that, in the course of the history of
scientific doctrines statements have been formulated again and again, which in
retrospect have proved to be wrong, therefore applies first to the scientist
who, as a kind of pioneer, was the first to formulate a hypothesis about an
earthly event.
In fact, the individual scientist exhibits all the
characteristics of human incapacity. He can simply make a mistake in the
formulation of a thesis, in this case he is firmly convinced that he has
pointed out a new connection, but nevertheless this statement can prove to be
wrong in retrospect, simply because in the formulation of this thesis certain
variables were not recognised, perhaps could not even be recognised, which have
an influence on the connection expressed.
Scientific statements generally have the following
format: Whenever the variable x is given, then the occurrence of the variable y
is to be expected. However, it must almost always be assumed that the variable
x only triggers the event y if a number of other variables are also given, but
sometimes other variables are not given at that time. Since our knowledge of
reality is always imperfect, we can never be completely sure whether we already
know all the relevant constraints and whether the statement is therefore true
in each and every case.
Furthermore, it must be considered that individual
factors such as origin, inclination or approach can very well affect the view
of the individual scientist, so that certain statements of individual
scientists can be untrue already due to these individual imperfections.
If, despite this statement, the sciences have made
enormous progress in their efforts to gain knowledge of reality in the course
of their history, i.e. if very many statements of science have proven to be
true, then this is because science represents a system in which a division of
labour is involved and the results can be achieved primarily because a large
number of scientists have always been involved in the formulation of a theory.
A theory generally begins with making observations
(perhaps by pure chance) and thereby observing certain regularities, precisely
in the sense that a certain event x results in another event y. A hypothesis is
then formulated from these observations. And this means: it appears that this
correlation of effects exists. At this stage, however, no new theory has been
born yet; numerous enquiries are needed to confirm or reject this hypothesis.
Only then, when several empirical enquiries, which have been carried out in
accordance with very specific criteria, come to the
conclusion that it has not been possible to disprove this hypothesis, it
is said that this statement can provisionally be regarded as confirmed, as a
kind of theory; only provisionally because we can never be sure whether all
factors relevant to an interdependence have really been taken into account in
the experiments.
Therefore, it must always be expected that one or the
other theory is not true despite prior correctly conducted empirical
investigations. However, while we can assume that individual imperfections in
the formulation of a hypothesis can contribute to one or the other hypothesis
being formulated incorrectly in a first step it must be said in the context of
empirical verification that human weaknesses are more likely to contribute to
the recognition of the falsity of a statement. Just the fact that, for example,
a researcher B envies researcher A's success can contribute to B's efforts to
refute the hypothesis formulated by A through empirical verification. And the
more intensively he pursues this refutation, the more likely it is that, if an
empirical refutation has not been successful, it can be established that the
hypothesis formulated by A probably does indeed correspond to the truth.
Errors have occurred in the history of
doctrines in all areas of science. Even the exact natural sciences have not
been spared these shortcomings. For example, in ancient times, some scientists
and philosophers assumed a geocentric view of the world, i.e. the conviction
that the sun revolved around the earth, whereas today we assume since Copernicus
that the earth revolves around the sun like the other solar planets. In this
lecture, however, we want to deliberately limit ourselves to scientific
statements formulated within the humanities (i.e. the human sciences). And here
again critically examine primarily, but not exclusively, economic theories in
the narrower sense.
2nd
Teaching history as a history of errors
In my lecture on the history of economic teaching, I
mentioned at the beginning that a history of teaching can be structured
according to different criteria. I had decided there to place the respective
basic statements of scientific schools at the centre of this lecture. However,
another possible point of view from which to scrutinise the teaching history is
to list the errors of thinking of famous economists. This teaching history is
then based on the motto: Nobody is perfect, even very famous and recognised
researchers have made serious mistakes already.
So, it was mainly Ernst Wagemann
who published a paper in 1951 entitled 'Famous Errors of Thought in National
Economics' and collected some important erroneous developments in national
economics. The table of contents reveals in which theoretical works the author
denounces an erroneous development.
Thus, we learn, among other things, about "Old
and new perspective in the doctrine of value and money (the sin register of individualistic thinking)", about "
Conceptual and real order (the sin register of monistic thinking)",
"About the scope of absolutist doctrines (the sin register of absolutist
thinking)" and finally about "Quantitative analysis (the sin register
of out-of-measure/unmeasured thinking)".
Such an approach may well have some positive side
effects, by highlighting the fact that everyone can make mistakes. And if this
must be stated even for the greats and for "scientific popes", the
making of a few mistakes by lesser-known researchers should not already mean a
death sentence for the scientific careers of newcomers.
Nevertheless, it contributes more to confusion than to
an understanding of the development of economic theory if one wanted to begin
the study of the history of doctrine by first learning about the mistakes made
by the researchers. It is much better to start with the actual doctrinal
structure of the individual schools of thought and then, for the sake of
greater depth, to learn about the individual errors in the course of the
history of doctrine. For these reasons, I have not oriented my history of
teaching precisely by means of the actually formulated errors. This does not
mean, however, that it can still be appealing to critically examine individual
errors in a second step after the individual scientific schools of thought have
been presented in their main features in a first step.
3rd
Statements about reality versus approaches
Also in this case, I will not follow in the footsteps of Wagemann,
who critically examined individual lines of thought in economic theory and
obviously branded certain approaches as errors in reasoning. However,
approaches can never ever be classified as true or untrue. Approaches are
methods that we use to verify the truth of certain interdependencies, but they
themselves do just not consist of statements about reality.
Approaches can be suitable or less suitable for
recognising the truth of certain statements, but they themselves cannot be true or untrue. It should also be clear that approaches can serve
quite different goals and that therefore the question of suitability can only
ever be assessed with regard to a specific goal; there is no general
suitability or unsuitability of a particular approach.
Let us take the example of rose-coloured glasses. Of
course, these glasses are not suitable for recognising colours; all objects
viewed with such glasses appear to the observer as pinkish red, regardless of
what colour these objects radiate actually. But it is quite conceivable that
these glasses allow certain other structures of the considered object to be
recognised, indeed under certain circumstances the very fact that the different
colours are not recognised, i.e. that the main focus is not on recognising
colours, can contribute to the fact that one can concentrate all the better on
the other features and therefore also recognise them more sharply. Nor need the
purpose of the glasses be to recognise new features of the object being viewed;
for example, there are glasses that are simply intended to give the viewer the
pleasure of making certain objects in nature, such as meadows, appear all the
more radiant and in a saturated green, which, with these glasses, makes the
green appear lusher than it really is.
4th
Theories versus thought models
This lecture is therefore about the truth of
scientific statements and not about the appropriateness of certain approaches.
However, it can be admitted that models of thought have sometimes been
developed in science which have been falsely passed off as statements about
reality. For example, a dispute over methods within economics arose from the
rather different uses of the word 'theory'. Some scholars understand the term
'theory' in the sense of a thinking tool. Although a thinking tool makes it
possible to handle social reality, however, it must not be confused with actual
knowledge of factual connections.
The theory in the sense of a model of thought is a
method of expanding our knowledge, but it is not this knowledge itself. Such a
theory is limited to arranging already known facts and drawing further
conclusions from given assumptions. According to this understanding, finding
new factual connections is the responsibility of sociologists, not of economic
theorists. Economic theory could not verify the validity of the assumptions on
its own. Leaving aside logical errors in thinking, such a theory cannot be
wrong or right at all, but at most up-to-date and expedient.
These widespread theses of neoclassical theory were
attacked by the neopositivists at about the middle of the last century. Hans
Albert, for example, said that economic theory had degenerated into model
Platonism. One could only speak of a genuine theory if its statements referred
to factual connections that were already verified in reality or were at least
verifiable. The neoclassical theory, by contrast, presented doctrines already as proven truths, which were only logically derived from
hypothetically presumed assumptions and still needed empirical
verification.
Furthermore, neoclassicism worked with assumptions
that had already been refuted on the basis of past empirical studies. Finally,
in an attempt to defend classical positions, neoclassicism had increasingly
taken refuge in tautologies, which, although logically consistent always
correct, had therefore solidified into an empirically insubstantial empty
formula.
5th
Different statement types
Thus, let us deal in the following with the statements
about reality and not with the methods by which these statements were obtained.
Here, quite different types of statements can be distinguished, and we will see
that the possibilities and limits of scientific knowledge are different for the
individual types of statements and that therefore the question whether a true
or untrue statement has been made must also be examined in different ways. Let
us begin with a systematic overview of the multitude of possible types of
statements. The following diagram shows the connection between the individual
possible types of statements:
First, we divide the possible statements into
normative and explicative statements. Normative sentences say something that is
desired, they represent an evaluation. Explicative sentences, in contrast,
refer to explanatory statements, they show what is and what is not, and what
should be.
The explicative statements can be further subdivided
into logical and factual statements. Logical statements result from purely
intellectually derived connections, while factual statements refer to actual
(or assumed) causes and effects.
The factual statements can furthermore refer to
metaphysical or to empirical correlations. We always speak of empirical statements
when these theorems have been derived from observation, whereas all hypotheses
that escape observation must be classified as metaphysical. For example, I can
possibly observe that a certain person died on a certain day and in a certain
place. But whether the dead person continues to exist in some spiritual form as
a soul is beyond human observation and all statements on such events are
therefore of a metaphysical nature.
Both, the empirical and the metaphysical statements
can be further subdivided into singular and general statements. Statements that
refer to singular events are characterised by the fact that they occur in a
specific time and place and are limited to a single object or a section of
reality. General statements, on the other hand, refer to all objects of a
certain class regardless of time and space.
Let us consider initially the meaning of normative
statements. Jeremy Bentham had already recognised that it is not possible to
derive normative statements from factual statements alone. To get from factual
statements to evaluative statements, at least one normative premise is always
required.
Then it was particularly Max Weber who pointed
out that the scientist should refrain from value judgements, since the ultimate
fundamental values could neither be proven nor disproven scientifically.
Different conclusions were then derived from this postulate. Hans Albert
interpreted Max Weber's demand in such a way that the scientist had to limit
himself to the analysis of the possible. He had to show which possible
solutions to political problems are given, but not to promote one of these
possibilities.
In contrast, Gerhard Weisser, Hans Albert's teacher,
had advocated the view that the scientist could and should very well make
political recommendations, but he should always begin his political
recommendations by revealing the value premises on which his statements are
based. It is precisely the scientist who is called upon to formulate economic
policy goals, since he could recognise the correctness of individual policy
plans much better than laymen in economics could.
The modern welfare theory, on the other hand, took a
third path in the question of evaluating economic correlations: here, in a
first step, it is asked for the fundamental values that are accepted by
everyone or at least by the majority of people. In a second step, normative
conclusions are drawn from these fundamental premises together with further
factual statements.
Max Weber himself had indeed taken an evaluative stand
on political issues of the day at different times. In doing so, he expressed
that the principle of freedom of value judgement postulated by him required by
no means that the scientist should refrain from any value judgement. What is
important for Max Weber is merely the demand that in connection with statements
by a scientist it had to be clear always whether the scientist was reporting on
factual correlations or subjecting them to a political evaluation. For the
question of whether a statement about reality corresponds to the truth, the
scientist is an expert, and his scientific judgement thus generally has a
greater claim to truth than statements by untrained laymen. However, when a
scientist evaluates a political measure or a political condition, he expresses
himself as a free citizen whose statement does not deserve a higher claim to
truth than the political evaluation of any other citizen.
So next we distinguish between logical and factual statements.
The mind is capable of recognising logical contradictions. It is true that we
must reckon with the possibility that in everyday life we repeatedly encounter
logical contradictions and do not even recognise them as such in the beginning.
However, if we examine two statements with scientific meticulousness to see if
they are free of contradictions, we succeed in uncovering a logical
contradiction actually almost always.
Let us take an example. We divide the income
recipients into two classes: the class of wage earners and the remaining class
of profit earners. Those who do not belong to the class of wage earners are ex
definitione counted among the group of profit earners. If I now assume that the
share of wage earners (the wage share) in the total income of both classes
increases, then necessarily the share of profit earners (the profit share) must
decrease by the same amount by which the wage share increases. Thus, the
statement: 'the wage share rises' is in logical contradiction to the statement
that at the same time the profit share rises or even just remains constant.
This conclusion, however, does not represent any real
gain in knowledge about the reality of this world. The proven contradiction
refers solely to the system of concepts that we humans have formed. In our
example, we have defined the terms of the wage and profit ratio in such a way
that, for reasons of definition alone, the profit ratio cannot increase if the
wage ratio increases.
Of course, this realisation does not mean that definitions
constitute something superfluous in the context of the cognitive process. We
are dependent on our conceptual apparatus, without which we would not be able
to gain any knowledge about factual correlations. Only by initially forming
contradiction-free concepts we are at all able to make unambiguous statements
about the real interrelations in this world, which other people can also
verify.
Above all, without unambiguous terms that have
the same meaning for all people, we would not be able to communicate our
observations to other people at all; each individual would be left to his or
her own devices in the knowledge process and would not be able to draw on the
sum of knowledge previously gained by others. Scientific progress would not be
possible. Nevertheless, it remains the case that we have not yet gained any
knowledge through a contradiction-free concept formation alone; we have only
gained a precondition for gaining at all knowledge by observations.
6th
Problems with metaphysical statements
Let us turn now to the problem of those statements
that refer to factual connections. Here we distinguish between empirical and
metaphysical relations. Everything that we can observe here on earth or even in
the universe refers to empirical relations, but what eludes our observation has
a metaphysical background. Thus, we can observe what people do or how natural
events develop, but we are not able to gain knowledge about what happens after
our death, whether a part of us, our soul, continues to exist or whether all
individual existence ends with earthly death.
Nor can we observe whether there is a God who created
the world and thus also human beings and, if this is the case, in what way God
did this. These are metaphysical connections, i.e. connections that lie behind
the physical or earthly realm. Precisely because we cannot observe these
connections, a belief is needed to answer these questions that does not arise
from scientific knowledge - gained with the help of the mind.
Now Ludwig Wittgenstein expressed the opinion that one
should remain silent about what one cannot prove. Although I largely agree with
this view for the narrower field of science, this statement certainly does not
apply to metaphysical questions. Only when we are clear about the question of
whether there is a God and a life after death, and whether we will be judged
after death according to our behaviour on this earth, then we can also
determine how we should arrange our lives and how we should behave towards our
fellow human beings. Without a determination of these questions about the
meaning of life, we will likewise not find a convincing answer as to whether
man is really the measure of all things and is therefore also allowed to do
everything that benefits him, or whether moral commandments are to be observed,
which apply regardless of the interest of the individual human being.
Now it is in turn repeatedly claimed that even without
religious ties, it could be clearly demonstrated that the human being benefits
its own well-being if it adheres to the moral commandments. To arrive at the
ultimate basic values of humanity, there would be no need for religious
faith.
These atheistic attempts of justification have never
really convinced me. Of course, it is true that it benefits my individual
interest if all others around me behave in such a way that they observe the
moral commandments. It is even true that the willingness of others to observe
these moral commandments towards me depends on whether they can determine that
I myself behave towards them in accordance with these commandments.
From these considerations, however, the conclusion
cannot be drawn that it benefits the individual in every case if he
himself adheres to moral commandments. This would only be the case if all my
actions were known to the respective others. But precisely this cannot be
expected for two reasons. Firstly, the greater one's power, the greater the
possibility of keeping one's own immoral behaviour secret from the public. For
many leading elites, it is true that they have entered into informal bonds
already in their education, e.g. in elitist boarding schools, which are often
stronger than the official rules even in later years.
Because of this bond, behaviour that must be
classified as immoral is often covered up, and it is prevented from being made
known even when official knowledge of immoral behaviour should actually lead to
a complaint and thus to criminal prosecution. It is significant that when one
day the misconduct of a leading person does become known, the reproach from the
other leading elites does not so much culminate in the fact that the other
person had committed this misconduct, but that he was incapable of keeping this
misconduct secret.
Secondly, with the power of the individual also increases
the possibility of forcing the others, especially the subordinates, to behave
in a way that benefits the interests of the powerful, even if it is clear to
these others that the powerful person does not adhere to these moral
commandments towards the inferiors.
It is therefore to the benefit of the
functioning of a peaceful society if all people - including the powerful -
adhere to certain moral commandments and if this attitude has arisen from the
conviction of a moral responsibility and does not automatically arise only from
the fact that, under certain conditions, good conduct towards others also
benefits one's own interest. So much for the significance of metaphysical
statements.
A metaphysical problem also exists when in ancient times
and medieval times the opinion was expressed that the existence of God could be
unequivocally proven by scientific methods alone. Since scientific knowledge of
factual connections is only ever possible to the extent that the claimed
connections can be observed, and since it is not possible to observe the
existence of God unambiguously, there is also no possibility of proving the
existence of God unambiguously by scientific means alone. The assertion that
one can prove God's existence scientifically is therefore clearly false. There
is only the one possibility, that one considers the existence of God to be true
by means of an act of faith.
For just the same reasons, however, the assertion of
some atheists that one can disprove the existence of God with scientific means
alone is also clearly false, because this would also require the fundamental
possibility of observing God with human senses. Thus, the thesis of an atheist
that there was no God is just as much an act of faith as the faith of a
Christian, which cannot be decided by scientific methods alone.
7th
Singular statements
The statements about empirically observable events can
- as already indicated - be further subdivided according to whether they are
statements about singular or general events. We always speak of singular
statements when the event refers to a concrete single occurrence, i.e. when one
can determine the place, time and the respective subject or object of this
occurrence. If, for example, I state that a Mr XY performed a very specific
action on a specific day and at a specific hour in a specific place, I have
made a singular statement.
However, if I make certain connections for a larger
group of objects or subjects, then we speak of general statements. General
statements can always be expressed in the form: Whenever x is given, y is also
present, or respectively, for all x applies, if x is present, then y also
occurs. Let us give an example here as well. Let us consider the general
hypothesis of business theory, according to which entrepreneurs try to maximise
their profits under certain conditions (such as full competition).
We do not refer this statement to an individual
entrepreneur, nor do we restrict this statement to a certain period of time or
to a limited area but claim that this statement applies in principle to all
entrepreneurs, provided that certain conditions are given. Strictly speaking,
the profit maximisation thesis states that all entrepreneurs under conditions
of full competition show this behaviour, regardless of time and space and also
regardless of which good an entrepreneur offers.
However, most hypotheses in economics are so-called
statistical correlations and not exact laws. Like all human sciences, economics
is not capable of formulating laws in the sense of strict laws that apply to
each individual object since the objects to be dealt with are so complex. The
hypotheses formulated in economics are merely intended to express the fact that
a certain event on a considerable scale usually triggers another event.
Let us first look at the problem of singular
statements in more detail. In principle, we can assume that singular statements
can be clearly confirmed or, if necessary, also be refuted. Singular events can
be observed and for this very reason can be checked for their truthfulness with
the help of the human mind and the human senses. When I saw with my own eyes
that Mr Müller from Hagen gave a speech about the breeding of wolfhounds in
front of a selected audience on 02.03.2011, I can justifiably claim that this
statement could be verified precisely on the basis of my own observation.
Individual events are - as far as scientific
endeavours are concerned - first and foremost the subject of historical
investigations, these occurrences then often lie many years and centuries in
the past, there is often a lack of any written records in investigations of
events of very early times, so that here the observation is limited even to a
special extent. Witnesses of history cannot be interviewed themselves, the historians
are dependent on the in many cases few written reports and must - without being
able to ask the witnesses clarifying questions - check the correctness of the
reports on the basis of manifold plausibility considerations.
These considerations apply, of course, especially to
prehistoric epochs, for which almost every form of written account is missing.
For these epochs, science is dependent on archaeological results. And it is
precisely in this field of archaeology that considerable progress has been made
in recent decades. While in the first years of its development archaeology
still had to limit itself to proving the existence of certain people and
cultures on the basis of certain excavations, in recent decades archaeology has
succeeded in delivering downright astonishing results with regard to
determining the age, but also the ways of life and the circumstances that
brought about the collapse of ancient cultures.
Let us state in conclusion: In principle, singular
statements can indeed be verified and also falsified. In practice, however,
there are numerous difficulties that make neither a clear falsification nor a
verification possible. We must therefore assume that a considerable part of the
singular statements can actually not be unambiguously verified as to their
truth content.
8th General
statements
With the exception of the historical sciences, the
main focus of scientific work is on formulating and verifying general
statements. Here it also applies to an even greater extent than it does to singular
statements that the human mind is only to a limited extent able to
unambiguously verify such statements.
With the rise of the Age of Enlightenment, the
triumph of modern science began which, freed from the limitations imposed by the
Catholic Church on scientific inquiry, accumulated year after year new
knowledge about almost all areas of the world.
At the beginning of the modern era, efforts were made
initially within the framework of rationalism to gain knowledge solely by logical
deductions. This was followed by empiricism, which attempted to gain knowledge
not by deduction but by induction, i.e. by observation and generalisation of
these observations. In this context, one also spoke of positivism, in order to
indicate that science had to limit itself to the discovery of factual
connections, to what was experientially given, and that it had to deal solely
with ''is'', as Bentham had already recognised, and that it was therefore never
possible to conclude directly from ''is'' to ''ought''.
Finally, within the framework of neopositivism,
also called critical rationalism, it was recognised that laws in the sense of
general statements cannot be definitively verified at all due to the
limitations of the human mind. The human mind is only capable of falsifying
general statements that were previously considered valid, but not of verifying
them.
For example, if I formulate the statement 'All
entrepreneurs maximise profits' based on observations, I can falsify this
statement if I succeed in observing, strictly speaking, only one entrepreneur
to whom this statement does not apply. For if I can find such an entrepreneur,
then this statement does not apply to all entrepreneurs, because I have found
one or more entrepreneurs who do not follow this law.
Scientific progress therefore spreads not so much by
accumulating more and more knowledge or statements, i.e. that our construct of
scientific statements becomes larger and larger, but rather by weeding out
statements that were previously considered true and some of which were even in
logical contradiction to each other, i.e. that, in other words, although
perhaps fewer statements are considered true in total than before, the truth
content of the remaining statements has increased.
The reason why it is not possible at all to
unambiguously verify factual connections is that we can only gain our knowledge
through observation, but that we are not able to check all objects of a
statement for their truth content. Purely theoretically, it might still be
possible in principle to include all objects that exist currently in our
observation. However, general statements are valid independently of time and
space. If we declare a general statement to be generally valid, then these laws
would also have to apply in the past. However, this is exactly what we
generally cannot do, we cannot assume that such observations have been made
since the beginning of time and that - if they have been made - records of
these observations have been made.
But even if we could make such complete
observations for the present and the past, we do not know and cannot check
whether these regularities will also be valid in the future. We therefore do
not know whether the relationships discovered today or in the past are also
valid for the future and thus independent of space and time.
De facto, we can always - even in the present - only
make observations for a vanishingly small section of the objects to be
investigated, they are essentially limited to our time and mostly also to a few
spatial areas, so that we must always reckon with the possibility that an
observed regularity is not generally valid, because for practical reasons -
perhaps only because we lack the financial means for a complete examination -
we have not been able to observe all objects.
But why is it not enough that we make certain
observations on a few objects, why can't we assume that what we have observed
on an individual case is correct for all similar cases? If there really are
exact regularities, a correlation that has been proven for a certain object
should actually be valid for all similar cases and therefore it should be
sufficient to have proven this correlation in one example through observation.
However, at the beginning of a scientific study it is
not certain whether the observations are based on exact laws; the cases
observed in a few examples could have occurred purely by chance. For example,
it has been found that in areas where an above-average birth rate was observed,
an above-average number of storks nested at the same time.
However, it was not possible to conclude from this
that the fairy tale according to which children are brought by storks
corresponded to reality. Either this coincidence of high birth rates and high
numbers of stork nesting sites was really purely coincidental, or both
variables correlate with a third variable, which increases both the birth rate
and the number of storks.
The answer still lies in the fact that the
factual connections in reality are not so simple that a certain process x
always results in a certain event y. If the real processes were really so
simple, we could indeed assume that a few observations are sufficient to
declare a general statement as verified.
In reality, the natural interrelationships are very
complex, regularities express themselves in the fact that a certain event x
only triggers another event y with certainty if a whole set of further
conditions z1,
z2, … zn is present at the same time or, under certain circumstances, is just
not present, i.e. that the presence of a certain condition z just invalidates
the occurrence of this regularity (from x follows y).
Thus, if we now find in a series of observations that
event y was always triggered in response to event x (i.e. in all observations),
we cannot conclude from these observations that this will be the case at all
places or at all times. After all, we must reckon with the possibility that
this regularity could only be observed because an additional condition z was
given, which, however, was not known and which therefore could not be included
in the set of conditions. We must therefore reckon with the possibility that in
the future this regularity will no longer occur at all, either once or in other
places, because this additional condition will then not be fulfilled any more.
As conditions for the occurrence of a general
statement, only those conditions can be named of which we at least assume that
they are necessary for this regularity. Conversely, we must also reckon with the
fact that in the future this regularity will no longer occur because a certain,
but so far unknown event did not occur, but this event prevents the regularity
to be examined. In other words, we must assume that the occurrence of new,
previously non-existent events prevents event x from causing another event y,
as was previously the case.
This does not mean, however, that if a certain
regularity has proven itself in thousands and thousands of cases, a single or
even a small number of falsifications is sufficient to completely abandon this
hypothesis. After all, the falsification only means that the connection
formulated in this general statement is somewhat more complicated than it was
assumed originally. We must reformulate this statement and restrict it to
certain additional events.
9th The
demand for general validity
Let us now take a closer look at the general
statements about factual connections. Every science strives to arrive at
statements that are as generally valid as possible. The more general a
statement is, the greater is its scope of application. But when does a
scientific statement correspond to this principle? We consider a statement to
be generally valid if the thesis under discussion applies to all objects of a
well-defined class. For example, the sentence "All entrepreneurs strive
for profit" would satisfy our criterion, provided that this assertion
corresponds to reality.
However, we must not expect to be able to fulfil this
ideal always. But here too, the principle of 'all or nothing' does not apply.
There are different degrees of approximation to this postulate. Even if we
cannot always arrive at generally valid statements, we must nevertheless strive
to come as close as possible to this ideal. If we can state that most
entrepreneurs strive for profit, then this proposition corresponds better to
the scientific claims than if we could only claim this of some entrepreneurs.
Sometimes this demand is combined with a further
claim. While up to now we have only demanded that all, or as far as possible
all, objects of a well-defined class have a certain characteristic, we can
furthermore strive to extend our statements to ever larger classes. The
sentence: "All entrepreneurs strive for profit" would in this sense
be less generally valid than the sentence: "All economic people try to
maximise their utility." Entrepreneurs form only a section of the larger
class of people and profit maximisation is again only a section of the larger
class of utility maximisation.
However, the demand for general validity comes at a
high price. The greater the generality is, the greater is the degree of
abstraction. If we restrict ourselves to a relatively small class of objects,
we will generally find a wealth of common features. If, on the other hand, we
consider an ever larger class of objects, fewer
characteristics are likely to apply to all the objects in this class. Many
things can be said about the behaviour of entrepreneurs. However, if we ask
about the behaviour of all people, we will generally be able to identify far
fewer common traits.
Here, science faces a conflict. We expect a theory not
only to be generally valid, but also to have the lowest possible degree of
abstraction. Both demands are in conflict with each other. To the extent that
we meet one demand, we move away from the other. This conflict can only be
resolved by asking both for the generally valid properties as well as for the
specific differences from class to class.
10th Human
freedom and general validity
Up to now, we have deliberately left aside one
question. Can the demand for general validity be reconciled with human freedom?
Are there any generally valid laws at all in the social sphere? Doesn't this
demand assume a deterministic social philosophy?
First of all, we can state: In the field of economics,
there is a whole series of scientific but socially relevant laws with which an
economic theory must deal because they influence the solution of economic
problems. Let us think of the law of diminishing returns, which provides information
on how much production factors are needed to produce a certain quantity of
goods. These correlations are primarily of a technical nature. Nevertheless,
the law of diminishing returns falls within the field of interest of economic
theory because entrepreneurial decisions also depend, among other things, on
the course of this technical data.
There is a second point to consider. The demand for
general validity only contradicts human freedom if we relate our statements to
individuals. It would indeed be problematic if we wanted to assert a very
specific behaviour for each individual person. No matter how much the closer
circumstances suggest a certain action, we have no absolute certainty that a
certain person will not yet decide differently.
The main interest of economic theory, however, is not
individual behaviour but rather group behaviour. How Mr Müller or Mr Maier
reacts to a price change is of little interest to economic theory. More
important is the question of how the total demand or the total supply changes
with a price increase. Statements about this do apply with much greater
certainty. As long as only the number of considered cases is large enough, we
can expect that random deviations from a general trend will largely compensate
each other.
A third point should be noted. The empirical
social sciences are not primarily concerned with human behaviour itself, but
with the societal structure that influences this behaviour. The social sciences
provide information on the extent to which the structure of society restricts
the scope of action of individuals. Generally, people are left with a more or
less great freedom of choice. However, there are also situations in which the
social constraints become so strong that very specific behaviour must be expected.
Here we are allowed to speak of societal regularities. An entrepreneur who is
exposed to strong competition can only survive as an entrepreneur in the long
run if he takes advantage of all possible cases of cost reduction as well.